227.10 Statements of policy and interpretations of law; discrimination prohibited.

(1) Each agency shall promulgate as a rule each statement of general policy and each interpretation of a statute which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement or administration of that statute. A statement of policy or an interpretation of a statute made in the decision of a contested case, in a private letter ruling under s. 73.035 or in an agency decision upon or disposition of a particular matter as applied to a specific set of facts does not render it a rule or constitute specific adoption of a rule and is not required to be promulgated as a rule.

(2) No agency may promulgate a rule which conflicts with state law.

(2g) No agency may seek deference in any proceeding based on the agency's interpretation of any law.

(2m) No agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a term or condition of any license issued by the agency, unless that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this subchapter, except as provided in s. 186.118 (2) (c) and (3) (b) 3. The governor, by executive order, may prescribe guidelines to ensure that rules are promulgated in compliance with this subchapter.

(2p) No agency may promulgate a rule or take any other action that requires one or more lots to be merged with another lot, for any purpose, without the consent of the owners of the lots that are to be merged.

(3)

(a) No rule, either by its terms or in its application, may discriminate for or against any person by reason of sex, race, creed, color, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry.

(b) A rule may discriminate for or against a person by reason of physical condition or developmental disability as defined in s. 51.01 (5) only if it is strictly necessary to a function of the agency and is supported by data demonstrating that necessity.

(c) Each person affected by a rule is entitled to the same benefits and is subject to the same obligations as any other person under the same or similar circumstances.

(d) No rule may use any term removed from the statutes by chapter 83, laws of 1977.

(e) Nothing in this subsection prohibits the director of the bureau of merit recruitment and selection in the department of administration from promulgating rules relating to expanded certification under s. 230.25 (1n).

History: 1985 a. 182; 1987 a. 399; 2003 a. 33 ss. 2368, 9160; 2011 a. 21; 2013 a. 277; 2015 a. 55; 2017 a. 67, 369.

Guidelines promulgated outside the context of one particular contested case do not qualify for exception to the requirement that all rules must be filed under s. 227.023 [now s. 227.20]. Here, failure to file the guideline as a rule did not deprive the department of the authority to decide contested cases dealing with pregnancy leaves under the sex discrimination statute. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations, 228 NW 2d 649, 68 Wis. 2d 345, (1975).

When a party files an application for a license with an administrative agency and the latter points to some announced agency policy of general application as a reason for rejecting the application, such announced policy constitutes a rule, the validity of which the applicant is entitled to have tested in a declaratory action. Schoolway Transportation Co. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 240 N.W.2d 403 (1976).

When the department of transportation (DOT) revised its application of a statute to bring DOT's practices into conformity with the plain meaning of the statute, DOT followed a course it was obliged to pursue when confronted with its error. This is not a regulation, standard, statement of policy, or general order. Neither is it a statement of general policy or interpretation of a statute. Therefore, there was no requirement that DOT comply with the filing procedures mandated in connection with promulgation of administrative rules. Schoolway Transportation Co. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 240 N.W.2d 403 (1976).

The department of transportation (DOT) engaged in administrative rule making when it changed its interpretation of a statute whose terms did not specifically require the interpretation, the interpretation was administered as law, and DOT relied upon the interpretation to deny the issuance of a license in a form in direct contrast to the manner in which the statute was previously administered by the DOT. Those who are or will be affected generally by such an interpretation should have the opportunity to be informed as to the manner in which the terms of the statute regulating their operations will be applied. This is accomplished by the issuance and filing procedures under ch. 227 and the rule is invalid until such measures are taken. Schoolway Transportation Co. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 240 N.W.2d 403 (1976).

The legislature may constitutionally prescribe a criminal penalty for the violation of an administrative rule. State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976).

A memorandum announcing general policies and specific criteria governing all decisions on good time for mandatory release parole violations was a “rule" and should have been promulgated properly. State ex rel. Clifton v. Young, 133 Wis. 2d 193, 394 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1986).

An agency may use policies and guidelines to assist in the implementation of administrative rules provided they are consistent with state and federal legislation. Tannler v. Department of Health and Social Services, 211 Wis. 2d 179, 564 NW 2d 735 (1997)

An administrative agency cannot regulate the activities of another agency or promulgate rules to bind another agency without express statutory authority. George v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 72, 242 Wis. 2d 450, 626 N.W.2d 57, 00-2711.

Under ss. 227.10 (2m) and 227.11 (2) (a), created by 2011 Wis. Act 21, an agency must have explicit authority to impose license and permit conditions and must have explicit authority for rulemaking. Act 21 makes clear that permit conditions and rulemaking may no longer be premised on implied agency authority. OAG 1-16

The attorney general applied a 3-step analytical inquiry to determine whether a rule “contains a standard, requirement, or threshold that is more restrictive than the standard, requirement, or threshold contained in” a statute, in violation of s. 227.11 (2) (a) 3.: 1) examine whether both a rule and a statute contain a “specific standard, requirement, or threshold” governing the same subject matter conduct; 2) compare the two standards, requirements, or thresholds to determine if the rule is “more restrictive” than the statute; and 3) if the rule is more restrictive than the statute, evaluate whether the rule is otherwise “explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule,” as provided under sub. (2m). If the rule is more restrictive than the statute, and not otherwise explicitly permitted, the rule may not be enforced or administered. OAG 4-17.

Despite its procedurally lawful promulgation in the past, in light of changes to this section and s. 227.11 by 2011 Act 21, a rule may not be prospectively enforced or administered if it contains a “standard, requirement, or threshold” that is more restrictive than the relevant statute. OAG 4-17.