A. After a hearing has been completed, the members of the board shall proceed to consider the case and as soon as practicable shall render their decision, provided that the decision shall be rendered by a quorum of the board. In cases in which the hearing is conducted by a hearing officer, all members who were not present throughout the hearing shall familiarize themselves with the record, including the hearing officer's report, before participating in the decision. In cases in which the hearing is conducted by the board, all members who were not present throughout the hearing shall thoroughly familiarize themselves with the entire record, including all evidence taken at the hearing, before participating in the decision.

B. A decision based on the hearing shall be made by a quorum of the board and signed by the person designated by the board within sixty days after the completion of the preparation of the record or submission of a hearing officer's report, whichever is later. In any case, the decision must be rendered and signed within ninety days after the hearing.

History: 1953 Comp., § 67-26-13, enacted by Laws 1957, ch. 247, § 13; 1981, ch. 349, § 12; 1993, ch. 295, § 6.

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, in Subsection A, substituted "a quorum of the board" for "the board at a meeting where a majority of the members are present and participating in the decision" at the end of the first sentence; and made stylistic changes in the second and third sentences.

Standard of proof for a hearing under this section is by a preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. Board of Dentistry, 1986-NMSC-009, 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580.

Section requires that decision be made by majority of the members of the board. McCaughtry v. N.M. Real Estate Comm'n, 1970-NMSC-143, 82 N.M. 116, 477 P.2d 292.

The board is not required to give deference to a hearing officer's report. — Where the hearing officer was appointed to take evidence on a complaint that the dentist engaged in unprofessional conduct, the hearing officer found that the dentist had not engaged in unprofessional conduct and recommended that no disciplinary action be taken; the board reviewed the hearing officer's report and the evidence, and concluded that the dentist had engaged in unprofessional conduct; and the Uniform Licensing Act only permits the hearing officer to make findings, but not to make conclusions of law or recommendations regarding disciplinary action and requires the board to use its knowledge and expertise to make its own findings and conclusions, and to determine what disciplinary action is appropriate, the district court erred by concluding that the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to defer to the hearing officer's report. N.M. Bd. of Dental Health Care v. Jaime, 2013-NMCA-040, 296 P.3d 1261.

Effect of failure to timely sign decision. — Failure of the board of dentistry to render and sign its decision suspending a dentist's license within 90 days after completion of the hearing made the decision null and void. Foster v. Board of Dentistry, 1986-NMSC-009, 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580.

The 90-day time limit imposed by this section is expressly jurisdictional. Where the board fails to take action within the required 90-day period, its decision is void and must be reversed. Lopez v. N.M. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 1988-NMSC-039, 107 N.M. 145, 754 P.2d 522.

Authority of secretary of public education to revoke teachers' licenses. — Article XII, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution, the Uniform Licensing Act, Sections 61-1-1 et seq. NMSA 1978, the Public Education Department Act, Chapter 9, Article 24 NMSA 1978, the Public School Code, Chapter 22 NMSA 1978, and the School Personnel Act, Chapter 22, Article 10A NMSA 1978, do not preclude the secretary of public education from having exclusive authority to make the final decision to revoke a teacher's license. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d 469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Uniform Licensing Act is not a tax statute, and does not carry with it the presumption of correctness and burden of persuasion that favors the state in tax matters. Kmart Props., Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-026, 139 N.M. 177, 131 P.3d 27, aff'd, 2006-NMSC-006, 139 N.M. 172, 131 P.3d 22.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 53 C.J.S. Licenses §§ 43, 60.