Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented as follows:

A. the claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant and the amount claimed, or he may file a written statement of the claim with the appropriate court. The claim is presented on the first to occur of receipt of the written statement of claim by the personal representative or the filing of the claim with the appropriate court. If a claim is not yet due, the date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be described. Failure to describe correctly the security, the nature of any uncertainty and the due date of a claim not yet due does not invalidate the presentation made;

B. the claimant, without the necessity of filing a claim, may commence a proceeding against the personal representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction, to obtain payment of his claim against the estate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the claim. No presentation of claim is required in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which were pending at the time of his death; and

C. if a claim is presented under Subsection A of this section, no proceeding thereon may be commenced more than sixty days after the personal representative has mailed a notice of disallowance. However, in the case of a claim which is not presently due or which is contingent or unliquidated, the personal representative may consent to an extension of the sixty-day period, or, to avoid injustice, the district court on petition may order an extension of the sixty-day period, but in no event shall the extension run beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

History: 1953 Comp., § 32A-3-804, enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 257, § 3-804; 1983, ch. 194, § 6.

Official comments. — See Commissioners on Uniform State Law official comment to 3-804 UPC.

A wrongful death claim may properly be filed against the estate of a decedent in formal probate proceedings before the district court sitting in probate. Garcia v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2007-NMCA-042, 141 N.M. 421, 156 P.3d 712, aff'd 2008-NMSC-018, 143 N.M. 732, 182 P.3d 113.

Requirements are mandatory. — Neither the heirs nor the personal representative can be estopped from asserting or can waive the mandatory requirements of the nonclaim statute, which is comprised of this section and 45-3-803 and 45-3-806 NMSA 1978. In re Estate of Mayfield, 1989-NMSC-016, 108 N.M. 246, 771 P.2d 179.

Section consistent with 45-3-806 NMSA 1978. — Subsection C of this section is consistent and harmonious with 45-3-806 NMSA 1978, if the extension authorized by Subsection C is granted prior to expiration of the 60-day period. Mathieson v. Hubler, 1978-NMCA-119, 92 N.M. 381, 588 P.2d 1056, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554.

No extension of time after 60-day period has expired. — A trial court has no authority under Subsection C of this section to extend the time for proceeding against a personal representative after the 60-day period has expired. Mathieson v. Hubler, 1978-NMCA-119, 92 N.M. 381, 588 P.2d 1056, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554.

Extensions of time. — Subsection C does not deal with the time limits for presenting claims under 45-3-803 NMSA 1978, and does not authorize the trial court to extend the time limits of 45-3-803 NMSA 1978. In re Estate of Oney, 1981-NMCA-026, 95 N.M. 640, 624 P.2d 1037.

Claim via amended pleadings. — It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit amendment to pleadings which would have added to claim statement that claimant would show that decedent had stated that decedent was going to provide for claimant in decedent's will, where the requested amendment was made at the commencement of trial and would add nothing to the claim, since it was nowhere alleged that claimant had performed services for decedent pursuant to an agreement that decedent would provide for claimant in decedent's will. Montoya v. Friedman, 1956-NMSC-098, 61 N.M. 446, 301 P.2d 1094.

Claim of liability on bank stock owned by testator. — Claim against executor for superadded liability on bank stock owned by testator, on account of insolvency of state bank occurring after testator's death, is not governed by statutory requirements for filing in probate court nor by statute of nonclaim. Tierney v. Shakespeare, 1930-NMSC-009, 34 N.M. 501, 284 P. 1019.

Revival of suit pending at death. — The revival of a suit which is pending against a decedent at the time of death, within the time prescribed for filing claims against decedent's estate, obviates the necessity to present a claim to the executor or administrator. Romero v. Hopewell, 1922-NMSC-037, 28 N.M. 259, 210 P. 231.

Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to estates and trusts, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 363 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Prosecution of action or claim against estate by beneficiary as forfeiture of share in will by virtue of clause therein so providing, 30 A.L.R. 1014.

Necessity of presenting claim to executor or administrator before bringing suit, 34 A.L.R. 362.

Sufficiency of notice of claim against decedent's estate, 74 A.L.R. 368.

Sufficiency of presentation of claim for mortgage on real estate, 78 A.L.R. 1153.

Exclusiveness of grounds enumerated in statute providing, under specified circumstances, extension of time for filing claims against decedent's estate, 57 A.L.R.2d 1304.

Amount of claim filed against decedent's estate as limiting amount recoverable in action against estate, 25 A.L.R.3d 1356.

34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 416.