Making or permitting false public voucher consists of knowingly, intentionally or wilfully [willfully] making, causing to be made or permitting to be made, a false material statement or forged signature upon any public voucher, or invoice supporting a public voucher, with intent that the voucher or invoice shall be relied upon for the expenditure of public money.

Whoever commits making or permitting false public voucher is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-23-3, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 23-3.

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.

Cross references. — For forgery, see 30-16-10 NMSA 1978.

Section not vague. — Section is not unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous or indefinite; it gives fair warning of the prohibited acts and declares those acts to be a crime. State v. Sierra, 1977-NMCA-075, 90 N.M. 680, 568 P.2d 206, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414.

"Material." — Meaning of "material" herein is not vague, ambiguous or indefinite, as it imports nothing less than a matter which is so substantial and important as to influence a party. State v. Sierra, 1977-NMCA-075, 90 N.M. 680, 568 P.2d 206, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414.

"Public money". — The term "public money", as used in this section, is sufficiently specific to not require a person of ordinary intelligence to guess at the conduct the statute proscribes. State v. Hearne, 1991-NMCA-046, 112 N.M. 208, 813 P.2d 485.

Section applies to public employees. — This section is unambiguous and applies to public employees as well as public officials. State v. Ellenberger, 1981-NMSC-056, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216.

The heading of this article, "Misconduct by Officials," does not restrict its application to public officials. State v. Ellenberger, 1981-NMSC-056, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216.

Applicability not determined by nature of expenditure. — It cannot be the nature of the expenditure which determines the applicability of this section. If the nature of the expenditure was relied upon to determine if funds were "public money", then absurd results are produced. Any public official could falsify public vouchers for his own purposes and then defend himself by claiming the funds were not "public money" because they were not spent for a "public purpose". State v. Hearne, 1991-NMCA-046, 112 N.M. 208, 813 P.2d 485.

Money donated to university by private individual. — It would be against public policy to allow a university official to enter into private agreements to expend funds made available only to pursue the agenda of the donating entity. To rule otherwise would mean any benefactor of the university could create a fund, give authority over the fund to a university official and claim the fund did not contain public money, thereby circumventing all university spending and accounting policies. State v. Hearne, 1991-NMCA-046, 112 N.M. 208, 813 P.2d 485.

State university head coach. — This section applies to a state university head coach. State v. Ellenberger, 1981-NMSC-056, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216.

Prosecution for both fraud and violation of this section permitted. — The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the prosecution of an individual under both this section and 30-16-6 NMSA 1978. State v. Ellenberger, 1981-NMSC-056, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216.

Because the fraud statute does not require the making of a false voucher, and the false-voucher statute does not require the misappropriation or taking of anything of value, and because fraud, unlike the crime of making false public vouchers, requires proof of the victim's reliance, defendant may be prosecuted and sentenced for violation of both statutes. State v. Whitaker, 1990-NMCA-014, 110 N.M. 486, 797 P.2d 275, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 631, 788 P.2d 931.

Joinder of fraud, bribery and racketerring counts. — The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever counts of fraud and receiving a bribe from other counts where there was no evidence the multiplicity of charges confused the jury, the multiplicity of charges were not cumulative, and the counts were predicate offenses for a racketeering charge. State v. Armijo, 1997-NMCA-080, 123 N.M. 690, 944 P.2d 919.

Evidence sufficient to convict. — See State v. Armijo, 1997-NMCA-080, 123 N.M. 690, 944 P.2d 919.

Dual salaries prohibited. — A person may not be employed as a juvenile probation officer and deputy court clerk and paid as both although performing no services as deputy court clerk since this section makes it a fourth-degree felony to make or permit to be made a false public voucher for the expenditure of public money. 1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-152.

Restitution. — Upon conviction under this section, 30-23-7 NMSA 1978 would come into play and recovery thereunder could be had. 1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-152.

Law reviews. — For comment, "The Use of an Information Following the Return of a Grand Jury No Bill: State v. Joe Nestor Chavez," see 10 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (1979-1980).