Any person in interest dissatisfied with an order or determination of the planning commission, after review of the order or determination by the governing body of the municipality, may commence an appeal in the district court pursuant to the provisions of Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978.

History: 1953 Comp., § 14-18-8, enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 300; 1998, ch. 55, § 5; 1999, ch. 265, § 5.

Cross references. — For procedures governing administrative appeals to the district court, see Rule 1-074 NMRA.

The 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, substituted "Section 39-3-1.1" for "Section 12-8A-1".

The 1998 amendment, effective September 1, 1998, rewrote this section to the extent that a detailed comparison would be impracticable.

Standard of review. — This section does not contemplate pure de novo review by the district court, but provides the court more discretion in deciding issues than is inherent under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The court is not required to indulge every inference in favor of an agency action but, on the contrary, is required to exercise its own judgment in light of the agency decision and the evidence presented to it at trial. At the conclusion, the court has the power to order the approval of a request, rather than merely vacating the agency decision and remanding for further proceedings. Clayton v. Farmington City Council, 1995-NMCA-079, 120 N.M. 448, 902 P.2d 1051 (decided under prior law).

Review of appeal, not mandamus. — Developer who alleged that city council failed to approve his plat within the statutory time limit of 35 days and that, therefore, the plat was approved by operation of law had adequate remedies at law through this section, which he had not exhausted; the administrative procedures of this section, not the extraordinary writ of mandamus, provided developer with his proper avenue to challenge the council's actions. State ex rel. Hyde Park Co. v. Planning Comm'n of the City of Santa Fe, 1998-NMCA-146, 125 N.M. 832, 965 P.2d 951.

Appeal not a collateral attack. — Appeal should not be regarded as impermissible collateral attack on the order of the district court by which lawsuit against the city was dismissed because the order specifically references the settlement between the parties and because the settlement contains the terms of the very development agreement that petitioner seeks to overturn. Lewis v. City of Santa Fe, 2005-NMCA-032, 137 N.M. 152, 108 P.3d 558, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-005, 137 N.M. 522, 113 P.3d 345.