39-1329. State highways; egress and ingress, when required; department; prescribe access.

The right of reasonable convenient egress and ingress from lands or lots, abutting on an existing highway, street, or road, may not be denied except with the consent of the owners of such lands or lots, or with the condemnation of such right of access to and from such abutting lands or lots. If the construction or reconstruction of any highway, to be paid for in whole or in part with federal or state highway funds, results in the abutment of property on such highway that did not theretofore have direct egress and ingress to it, no rights of direct access shall accrue because of such abutment, but the department may prescribe and define the location of the privilege of access, if any, of properties that then, but not theretofore, abut on such highway.

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Annotations

There is no right of direct access to a highway constructed upon a new right-of-way where no highway previously existed if the new highway is designated a controlled access facility from the beginning. Morehead v. State, 195 Neb. 31, 236 N.W.2d 623 (1975).

Request for instruction relating to this section properly refused when other instructions impliedly excluded irrelevant items addressed thereby. Thacker v. State, 193 Neb. 817, 229 N.W.2d 197 (1975).

Evidence of the use of federal funds in a state road project is not admissible in an eminent domain proceeding, but its admission in this case was not prejudicial. Y Motel, Inc. v. State, 193 Neb. 526, 227 N.W.2d 869 (1975).

An abutting property owner is entitled to recover damages resulting from the destruction or material impairment by the state of his right of access to an existing highway or street, not to restoration of access. Danish Vennerforning & Old Peoples Home v. State, 191 Neb. 774, 217 N.W.2d 819 (1974).

Where there was no previous access to highway, landowner in eminent domain proceedings acquired no new access rights. Frank v. State, 176 Neb. 759, 127 N.W.2d 300 (1964).

Adjoining landowner cannot be denied reasonable means of egress and ingress. Chaloupka v. State, 176 Neb. 746, 127 N.W.2d 291 (1964).