28-919. Tampering with witness or informant; jury tampering; penalty.

(1) A person commits the offense of tampering with a witness or informant if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation of a criminal or civil matter is pending or about to be instituted, he or she attempts to induce or otherwise cause a witness or informant to:

(a) Testify or inform falsely;

(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing;

(c) Elude legal process summoning him or her to testify or supply evidence; or

(d) Absent himself or herself from any proceeding or investigation to which he or she has been legally summoned.

(2) A person commits the offense of jury tampering if, with intent to influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case, he or she attempts directly or indirectly to communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.

(3) Tampering with witnesses or informants is a Class IV felony, except that if such offense involves a pending criminal proceeding which alleges a violation of another offense classified:

(a) As a Class II misdemeanor or a lower classification or a violation of a city or village ordinance, the offense is a Class I misdemeanor; or

(b) As a Class II felony or a higher classification, the offense is a Class II felony.

(4) Jury tampering is a Class IV felony, except that if such offense involves a pending criminal proceeding which alleges a violation of another offense classified as a Class II felony or a higher classification, the offense is a Class II felony.

Source

Annotations

Sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to persuade the victim, who is also the witness, to withhold any further information concerning the rape she had reported. State v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 560 N.W.2d 157 (1997).

A person who has knowledge of a relevant fact or occurrence sufficient to testify in respect to it is a witness for the purpose of this section, even if such knowledge is not firsthand. State v. Cisneros, 248 Neb. 372, 535 N.W.2d 703 (1995).

A witness, for purposes of this provision, is one who has knowledge of a relevant fact or occurrence sufficient to testify in respect to it. State v. McCoy, 227 Neb. 494, 418 N.W.2d 250 (1988).