(1) For defendants who have entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony on or after July 1, 2006, a defendant may petition for postsentencing DNA testing under s. 925.11 under the following circumstances:

(a) The facts on which the petition is predicated were unknown to the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney at the time the plea was entered and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(b) The physical evidence for which DNA testing is sought was not disclosed to the defense by the state prior to the entry of the plea by the petitioner.

(2) For defendants seeking to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony on or after July 1, 2006, the court shall inquire of the defendant and of counsel for the defendant and the state as to physical evidence containing DNA known to exist that could exonerate the defendant prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. If no physical evidence containing DNA that could exonerate the defendant is known to exist, the court may proceed with consideration of accepting the plea. If physical evidence containing DNA that could exonerate the defendant is known to exist, the court may postpone the proceeding on the defendant’s behalf and order DNA testing upon motion of counsel specifying the physical evidence to be tested.

(3) It is the intent of the Legislature that the Supreme Court adopt rules of procedure consistent with this section for a court, prior to the acceptance of a plea, to make an inquiry into the following matters:

(a) Whether counsel for the defense has reviewed the discovery disclosed by the state and whether such discovery included a listing or description of physical items of evidence.

(b) Whether the nature of the evidence against the defendant disclosed through discovery has been reviewed with the defendant.

(c) Whether the defendant or counsel for the defendant is aware of any physical evidence disclosed by the state for which DNA testing may exonerate the defendant.

(d) Whether the state is aware of any physical evidence for which DNA testing may exonerate the defendant.

(4) It is the intent of the Legislature that the postponement of the proceedings by the court on the defendant’s behalf under subsection (2) constitute an extension attributable to the defendant for purposes of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

History.—s. 2, ch. 2006-292.