(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.

(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229 clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to “building” definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 174 C. 135; 178 C. 67; 194 C. 279; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92; 200 C. 685; 204 C. 4; Id., 769; 210 C. 519; 216 C. 678; 219 C. 605; 220 C. 796; 222 C. 469; 227 C. 829; 235 C. 679; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828.

Cited. 8 CA 581; 12 CA 32; 35 CA 527; Id., 714; 36 CA 454; 40 CA 789; 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire; injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 1; 187 C. 109; Id., 513; 191 C. 412; Id., 636; 199 C. 1; 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201; 207 C. 118; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1; 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747; 221 C. 713; 227 C. 1; 229 C. 10; 240 C. 708; 241 C. 57. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Subdiv. (4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Subdiv. (3); evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.

Cited. 10 CA 147; 12 CA 343; 28 CA 9; 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10; 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753; 37 CA 360; 39 CA 800. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent; although prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial; jury instructions were proper. 75 CA 163. Definitive expert testimony that a fire was started intentionally is not required for a conviction. 127 CA 560.