Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, except an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a, shall be imprisoned for a term of five years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony.

(P.A. 93-306, S. 9.)

Cited. 234 C. 455; 241 C. 665. Section is a sentence enhancer rather than a separate offense; a separate conviction under section is improper. 242 C. 143. When jury convicts based on an underlying felony, jury must also determine issue of whether a firearm was used in commission of the felony. 253 C. 210. Unarmed accomplice is subject to an enhanced penalty under section. 255 C. 782. Where court failed to instruct jury as to elements of statute which provided for enhancement of sentence, enhanced sentence was vacated and case remanded for trial on that issue. 256 C. 785. Based on plain language of section, its legislative history, and prior court decisions interpreting its provisions, application of sentence enhancement to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, a class B felony, does not violate double jeopardy; based on section's language and its legislative history, trial court properly applied section's sentence enhancement to defendant's split sentence. 257 C. 544. State need not prove that firearm was capable of discharging a shot to apply statute as sentence enhancement. 259 C. 799. Section imposes separate enhancements of 5 years each where defendant is convicted of multiple qualifying felonies arising from the same incident. 263 C. 136. Possession of firearm by one coconspirator is not attributable to other coconspirators for purposes of enhancement statute. 276 C. 452. State is required to prove only that defendant was guilty of being an accessory to underlying robbery and that a firearm was used in the commission of the robbery, and need not prove that defendant intended that firearm would be used during the robbery. 315 C. 500.

Cited. 43 CA 801; 44 CA 561; 48 CA 361. Since section is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, conviction under section must be vacated. 49 CA 420. Trial court improperly rendered judgment convicting defendant of the crime of commission of class A, B or C felony with a firearm because statute does not establish a separate criminal offense but is a sentence enhancement provision. 51 CA 171. Section intended to serve as sentence enhancement provision, not as a separate crime. Id., 541. Reaffirmed ruling that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 52 CA 599. Reaffirmed prior holdings that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 54 CA 18. Under section, state is not required to demonstrate that defendant actually had a gun, but that defendant represented, by words or conduct, that he was holding a gun. 60 CA 487. Failure to instruct jury re elements of statute was harmless error, since evidence against defendant was overwhelming and uncontested, and not violative of due process. 61 CA 417. Trial court determination that defendant fulfilled requirements of sentence enhancement pursuant to statute results in harmless error if jury would have, upon proper instruction, reached the same determination. 65 CA 551. Statute permits multiple enhancements. 69 CA 717. Failure of court to instruct jury that finding defendant used a firearm was harmless error where state has proven the elements necessary for sentence enhancement. 74 CA 129. Plaintiff's claim that trial court did not put issue of enhancement under statute to the jury was harmless error since verdict required finding that the murder was committed with a firearm. Id., 391. Court declines to create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the state seeks sentence enhancement pursuant to section after defendant elects a jury trial; sentence enhancement pursuant to section not treated as essential element of statute and state need only prove to jury the two elements of statute and is not required to prove that length of defendant's incarceration should be increased. 81 CA 824. Legislature's use of “shall” in section, coupled with precedent, amply supports conclusion that legislature intended sentence enhancement to apply to conviction under Sec. 53a-59(a)(5). 90 CA 445. Since section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate offense, conviction under section must be vacated. 94 CA 715. Trial court properly applied sentence enhancement provisions of section in a matter where defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled nolo contendere to section's provisions; in doing so, defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the facts with respect to that charge. 103 CA 100. Enhancement of defendant's sentence for conviction of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree was improper because section does not apply to unarmed coconspirators; where defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child only as a principal, and not as an accessory, and there was no evidence that defendant personally had used a firearm in the commission of the offense, sentence enhancement pursuant to section was not appropriate; section is not an offense. 160 CA 815. Enhancement of sentences for unarmed accomplices is permissible under section; finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm had been used in the commission of each of the crimes of which defendant was found guilty as an accessory provided sufficient basis to impose sentence enhancement pursuant to section. Id., 851.